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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintif!-Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

LOUIS Vi/. BONNY, JR.,

12087

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment of the District
Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake
County, wherein appellant was found guilty of Escape
from the Utah State Prison.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of the Third Judicial District, in
and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, presiding, denied appellant's motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction, whereupon the
case was tried on stipulated facts without a jury. Appellant
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was found guilty of the crime of Escape, and was sentenced
as provided by law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the judgment of the trial
court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent is in agreement with the Statement of
Facts as set forth in appellant's brief with the following
additions and clarifications.
At arraignment on January 26, 1970, the prosecuting
attorney requested that the case be set for trial on January
28, 1970, which date was within ninety days from the day
appellant requested final disposition of the matter pending
·against him.

Defense counsel was unable to accept the suggested
date. Upon inquiry by the court as to when the next most
available time was, both attorneys indicated that the 9th
of February, 1970, was alright. The court then ruled that
the matter "[m]ay be set for the 9th of February." (Arraignment T. 3).
Thus, prosecutor did request a trial date, which date
was within the ninety day period. Defense counsel was not
able to accept the date. The court, with the approval of
both defense counsel and prosecutor, set the trial for February 9, 1970, which date was only five days beyond the
ninety day period.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT HAD .JUlUSDlCTION BEYOND NJNETY DAYS. FROM FILING OF REQUEST FOR FINAL DISPOSITION AND DID
NOT ERR IN CONVICTING AND SENTENCING APPELLANT, IN THAT PURSUANT TO
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-65-1 (SUPP. 1969),
THE COURT GRANTED A NECESSARY AND
REASONABLE CONTINUANCE FOR GOOD
CAUSE.
The issue in case at bar falls within the Utah Detainer
Act which provides in part:
"Whenever a person has entered upon a term
of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of this state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending
in this state any untried indictment, information or
complaint against the prisoner, he shall be brought
to trial within ninety days after he shall have cau.sed
to be delivered to the. county attorney of the cou:p.ty
in which the indictment, information or complaint
is pending and the appropriate court written notice
of the place of his imprisonment and his request for
a final. disposition to be made of the. indictment,
information or complaint: pro,vided, that for a g<;>od
cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of
the matter may ora11t any riece.ssm·y or 1·easonable
continuance . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (a)
(Supp. 1969). (Emphasis added.)
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"In the event that the action is not brought to
trial within the period of time as herein provided,
no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or
effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing
the same with prejudice." Utah Code Ann. § 7765-2 (Supp. 1969).
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that the legislature, by passing these statutes, intended to put the burden
of compliance upon the prosecutor. State v. l-Vilson, 453
P. 2d 158, 22 U. 2d 361 (1969).
In case at bar, the prosecutor attempted at arraignment to set the case for trial at a date within the ninety
day limit, but defense counsel was not able to accept the
date. The earliest date convenient for both attorneys was
a date five days beyond the ninety day limit, but a date
which the court established after hearing the requests and
considering circumstances of both the defense counsel and
the prosecutor.
Respondent submits that the continuance to a date
five days beyond the ninety day period was reasonable and
necessary, and was based upon good cause shown in open
court. Therefore, the facts are within the statutory provisions allowing extension of time, and the court had j urisdiction to try the matter 95 days after appellant"s request
for final disposition.
Appellant contends that the case at bar is on all fours
with State v. Wilson, supra. (Appellant's Brief at 5.) The
case at bar is not on all fours with Wilson, and is easily

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

distinguished in that in case at bar prosecutor requested
that the case be set for trial at a date within the ninety
day period; whereas, in "Wilson the prosecutor requested
a date beyond the ninety day period.
The purpose of the statute involved in case at bar, is
"to more precise]y define what is meant by 'speedy trial'
as that term is used in the constitutions of the various
states." State v. Wilson, supra, at 363.
The United States Supreme Court:
'·. . . has consistently been of the view that
' [t] he right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative.
It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It
does not preclude the rights of public justice.' [ citation omitted. J 'Whether delay in completing a
prosecution ... amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon the circumstances
... The de]ay must not be purposeful or oppressive.'
[citation omitted.] '[T]he essential ingredient is
orderly expedition and not mere speed.'" United
States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
The reasoning of the United States Supreme Court
concerning speedy trial may be applied to case at bar. Circumstances justified continuance; announcement by appellant of his inability to accept prosecutor's original requested
date for trial justified continuance to a reasonable date.
No rights of appellant were prejudiced. The de]ay was not
purposeful or oppressive. There was orderly expedition.
The court's decision to set the date five days beyond the
ninety day period was reasonauly made and was in com-
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with the appropriate statute. The facts fall well
\\rithin the constitutional standard of right to a speedy trial,
the Utah statute, and do not fall contrary to Utah case law.
:r~liance

The continuance granted in case at bar resulted in no
prejudice to appellant, and vrns not an abuse of the court's
discretion.
Where arraignment proceedings were conducted within
the ninety day period and prosecution attorney attempted to
set trial date within the ninety day period, but flefense couns.el was unable to accept suggested date, the court was acting
well wjthin the statutory limits in setting the date for trial
five days beyond the ninety day limit, because no earlier
date was convenient to both attorneys.
Furthermore, the ·above argument is based upon the
assumption that the ninety day period began running on
.November 6, 1969, "vhen an agent of Utah State Prison
received notice and request for disposition " of pending
charges. According to the decision of a recent· Utah case,
request is premature if it i~ submitted prior to time information is filed. State of Utah v. Belcher, Case No. 12077,
filed September 29, 1970. The information in case at bar
was filed January 23, 1970, and trial was held February 9,
1970. Therefore, trial was within the ninety day period.
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CONCLUSION
The continuance was granted pursuant to the statute.
The court had jurisdiction at the time it passed judgment
upon appellant. The respondent submits that neither appellant's statutory or constitutional rights were violated, and
therefore, the trial court's judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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